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This paper examines whether the learning effect of housing policies 
could empirically affect anomalies in the apartment market in Korea. 
We find that a learning effect exists in apartment market anomalies, 
but depending on area, estimation period and size, investors behave 
differently  to  anomalies  in  an  apartment  market  that  is  affected  by 
housing  policies.  Furthermore,  we  confirm  that  in  order  to  explain 
anomalies  in  detail  with  housing  policies,  we  need  to  consider 
economic  factors.  Of  these  economic  factors,  surprisingly,  oil  price 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In  Korea,  while  housing  policies  have  been  only  recently  announced,  the 
fluctuations of housing business conditions have been cyclical. Consequently, 
socioeconomic polarization of housing has been intense for a long time and 
this  has  caused  complications  across  social  stratums.  The  essential  aim  of 
housing  policies  is  to  improve  housing  environments  by  stabilizing  the 
apartment  market,  but  many  investors  believe  that  such  policies  are 
inconsistent with the real estate business. Thus, housing conflicts still remain 
in the market. 
 
Therefore, some researchers have investigated whether housing plans devised 
by the government have any effect on the prices of real estate. Of these, many 
researchers have inquired about the effect of the introduction and abolition of 
carefully calculated housing plans after consideration of other market factors. 
For  instance,  Oh  (2005)  focuses  on  explaining  the  effects  of  changes  in 
housing and apartment prices on real estate policies. He proposes that the 5.22 
policy
1  (negative effect) in 1998 and 10.29 policy
2  (positive effect) in 2003 
have significant effects on the changes in housing and apartment prices. 
 
Likewise, Chung (2005) has shown that the rapid changes in real estate prices 
have  a  strong  effect  on  real  estate  policies,  and  the  housing  market  also 
responds strongly to real estate plans devised by the government rather than to 
the land market. In 2004, the Korean government had not managed to resolve 
the issues around real estate prices, but on August 31, 2005, a formal policy 
was officially announced. Furthermore, Cho and Chung (2007) have insisted 
that in order to decrease housing prices, the government should not devise 
housing plans that include strong restraints on demand and excessive supply. 
Also, they have argued that the government should not stabilize the real estate 
market by setting the tone for only housing policies. What is more, Chung 
(2007)  has  provided  evidence  in  which  the  real  estate  market  in  southern 
Seoul and nationwide react negatively to the policy, but the Daejeon market 
has  nevertheless,  followed  the  policy.  Also,  he  has  suggested  that  both 
housing and rental markets significantly respond to real estate policies and 
follow the aim of the policies in the period from 1988 to 2002. However, 
during 2002 through to 2006, the real estate market reacted against real estate 
policies.  Moreover,  Seo  (2008)  has  found  that  the  apartment  market  in 
southern Seoul and large-size apartment market do not consistently meet the 
                                                       
1  To boost the housing market in Korea, the ‘5.22 policy’ was announced in 1998. The 
essential  particulars  of  this  policy  are  the  liberalization  of  housing  sale  prices, 
exemption of housing sales tax and the abolition of housing contracts. 
2  In order to control speculation and extreme demands in housing, the ‘10.29 policy’ 
came into effect in 2003. After the ’10.29 policy’ was released, the price of real estate 
stabilized for one year. This policy had provided many positive changes related to 
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goals  of  the  policies,  regardless  whether  the  goals  were  attainable  or  not. 
However, northern Seoul and the national capital region, local and small-size 
markets had a significantly positive reaction to the policies.   
 
Curiously, despite the findings of many researchers, ‘the learning effect of 
housing policies’ has not been examined to date in Korea. In this paper, for 
the first time, we suggest the idea of ‘the learning effect of housing policies’ 
which means that all investors learn about future events concurrently, that is, 
there is likely to be a common understanding prior to public announcements 
(Errunza and Miller (1998)). The learning effect for future housing policies is 
a procedure in which practical investors accept information at different time 
periods in advance. This means that there can be hints about future housing 
policies through the news, so future housing policies can be better anticipated 
by market participants.   
 
Moreover, little research has been conducted on the market adjusted method 
in the investigation of individual markets. Many researchers fail to examine 
local  market  anomalies  in  terms  of  housing  policies  in  a  specific  market, 
because  they  do  not  take  note  of  which  abnormal  returns  on  individual 
markets  should  be  employed  to  obtain  anomalies  purely  in  the  individual 
markets. The elements in the total housing market should be eliminated by 
using  a  market  adjusted  model  to  obtain  factors  that  purely  belong  to 
individual  markets.  This  can  be  considered  purely  as  individual  market 
anomalies.  In  order  to  identify  whether  there  only  exist  individual  market 
anomalies, an event study is tested in this paper. 
 
Furthermore, following the findings of Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), it could 
be likely that the prices on assets are sensitively coupled with a variety of 
systematic economic news. Investors view these macroeconomic conditions as 
a sort of investment risk. The synchronization between assets and economic 
state variables means that there exists an exogenous influence on economic 
factors. In general, the price on assets is considered to react to external shocks, 
although they have feedback effects. It is likely normal that all economic state 
variables are eventually endogenous. Therefore, this paper models the prices 
on assets by using macroeconomic variables. It is apparent that systematic 
factors  influence  the  changes  in  the  discount  factor  of  assets,  so  that  the 
discount rate changes with the interest rates, term structure and risk premium 
in pricing assets. The rate of inflation would also affect the interest rates and 
systematically influence the changes in asset prices. 
 
At this point, as far as we know, this paper is the first to investigate whether 
the  learning  effect  of  housing  policies  has  an  effect  on  anomalies  in  the 
individual apartment market, adding lagged dummy variables from housing 
policies and economic state factors. The main goal of this paper is that we 
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market  and  we  will  find  the  determinants  of  anomalies  on  the  individual 
apartment market created by housing policies.   
 
In our article, first, an event study is used to measure whether housing policies 
are associated with abnormal returns in the individual apartment market, so 
that we can ensure that there are market anomalies caused by housing policies. 
Secondly,  by  classifying  the  effects  of  housing  policies  into  two  parts 
(revitalization  and  stabilization),  we  will  estimate  abnormal  returns  in  the 
individual apartment  market. Abnormal returns in the individual apartment 
market  are  regressed  on  lagged  dummy  variables  of  housing  policies  by 
categorizing  areas  (the  national  capital  region  and  localities),  size  (large, 
medium,  small)  and  estimation  period  (1986-1999  and  2000-2009).  This 
allows us to  measure the existence, core and trends of different effects of   
housing policies on the individual apartment market. Finally, by containing 
macroeconomic state proxies as right-hand-side variables, abnormal returns 
on each market are regressed on the basis of the second step. 
 
The main results of this paper are that, underlying an event study, we can 
confirm that there exists the possibility of anomalies in the apartment market 
which results from housing policies. It appears likely that there is a learning 
effect in the apartment market which is associated with anomalies across area, 
sample  period,  and  size,  but  this  is  not  continuous  and  the  traits  and 
characteristics of the learning effect are different depending on area, period, 
and  size  of  apartment  assets.  The  most  noticeable  consequences  are  that 
investors in the national capital respond negatively to the aims of housing 
policies. This is in contrast with investors in the local areas. It seems likely 
that investors in the national capital market reflect upon private information 
and are more sophisticated than those in the local areas. 
 
Moreover,  anomalies  which  underlie  the  size  of  apartments  are  positively 
associated  with the purpose of housing policies to revitalize the apartment 
market for the sample period from 1986 to 1999. It is unlikely that anomalies 
which underlie the size of apartments react in contrast to the intentions of the 
housing policies to stabilize the apartment market, which implies that it is 
likely that investors in the apartment market interpret the aims of the housing 
policies differently and they have non-public information in regards to the size 
of apartment assets. 
 
We  ensure  that  not  only  the  dummies  of  the  housing  policies,  but  also 
economic state factors should be considered when investigating the effects of 
housing policies. It seems likely that oil price (OP) is a very important factor 
that explains the anomalies in apartment markets without any connection to 
area and size.   
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As a counterpoint to general belief, smaller returns in market portfolios have a 
significant effect on anomalies in localities. Interest rates that determine the 
decline in rate of assets is only significant in Busan for 1987-1999. 
 
It seems plausible that investors in Busan from 2000 to 2009 required more 
return as compensation for default risk tracking of long term business cycles 
in order to hedge against unexpected increases in default risk premia. Also, 
default risk tracking of long-term business cycles causes downward anomalies 
in the apartment market in southern Seoul. Moreover, term structure tracking 
of short-term business cycles from 2000 through 2009 is positively significant 
for anomalies in the Daegu market, which means as long term interest rates 
increase, the returns on the Daegu apartment market also increases. 
 
Aside  from  that,  inflation  from  2000  to  2009  was  negatively  related  with 
abnormal returns in the Daegu market, which implies that apartment assets in 
the  Daegu  market  do  not  serve  to  hedge  the  effects  of  inflation.  As  well, 
inflation triggered hedging apartment assets in Incheon for 2000-2009. Note 
that exchange rates are significant to anomalies in any apartment market; this 
suggests that anomalies in apartment markets are not linked with world-wide 
risk. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We introduce the data and explain sources and 
the nature of the data in Section II. We then show the methods with regards to 
abnormal returns on the local apartment market which adopt dummy variables 
in  housing  policies,  and  the  macro  variables  in  Section  III.  Section  IV 
suggests and interprets the results from regressions. Section V summarizes our 
findings and suggests some directions for future research. 
 
 
2.  Data Description 
 
2.1  Indexes of Apartment and Economic Factors 
 
Our sample includes the monthly indexes of apartment asset data from the 
Kookmin Bank for the period of 1986-2009. In general, real estate assets are 
accompanied with high transaction costs in Korea, therefore, the reason that 
we have especially chosen the indexes of apartment assets as proxies is that 
apartment assets have the highest liquidity compared to other types of real 
estate  assets.  Therefore,  the  cost  of  liquidity,  such  as  bid-ask  spread  and 
transaction costs could be small. In terms of territory and size factors that are 
important to price apartment assets, we have obtained apartment indexes of 
the  national  capital  region  (northern  Seoul,  southern  Seoul
3,  Incheon,  and 
                                                       
3  Historically, even though southern Seoul and northern Seoul constitute Seoul, the 
features of southern Seoul vary from that of northern Seoul. Without taking this into 




 and those of districts (Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, Gwangju, and 
Ulsan) from the Kookmin Bank data set.
  4  
 
The  index  data  is  constructed  monthly  based  on  actual  transaction  selling 
prices obtained from the Korean commercial housing market which comprise 
144 major cities in Korea on a national scale. The 144 cities are located in the 
metropolitan  area  and  region.  The  national  index  reflects  valued-weighted 
returns  in  consideration  of  characteristics  that  depend  on  the  region  and 
transactions, and includes new construction and existing apartments. 
 
In our study, the estimation period is broken into two sub-periods, which is 
1986-1999 and 2000-2009. That is because the traits of the Korean economy 
have  dramatically  changed  before  and  after  the  Asian  financial  crisis.  On 
account of the Asian financial crisis, the Korean economy has changed by and 
large, for example, in interest rates, default risk, the price of an apartment and 
many other things, and so without deliberation, the results would differ from 
reality.  For  that  reason,  we  have  divided  the  sample  period  into  two  time 
frames.   
 
Moreover, monthly economic factors that help to explain market anomalies 
were identified in the data set as suggested by the Bank of Korea. Economic 
factors  introduced  by  this  study  are  the  monthly  rates  of:  (i)  the  Korea 
Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI), (ii) one-year monetary stabilization 
bonds  (MSB),  (iii)  term  structures  (TERM),  (iv)  default  risk  premiums 
(DEFAULT), (v) oil prices (OP), (vi) exchange rates (EXCHANGE), and (vii) 
inflation (INFLATION).   
 
It should be added KOSPI, which is defined by the returns on stock market 
portfolios  is  regressed  to  examine  linkages  between  non  equity  assets  and 
stock market portfolios. In spite of smoothing and averaging the properties in 
a macroeconomic time series, these variables are not expected to capture any 
available information. It is well known that stock price responds promptly to 
public information.   
 
According to Fama (1981), Fama and Schwer (1977), and Chen, Roll, and 
Ross  (1986),  the  yield  on  three-month  T-bill  serves  as  a  proxy  for  future 
economic  activity.  Nevertheless,  in  the  interest  of  decreasing  correlations 
among state variables, we apply MSBs to serve as interest rates in Korea (Kim 
(2009)), when running the regression. 
 
                                                                                                                   
the regression dummies of Seoul with those in other areas. Many Korean researchers 
have investigated the Seoul housing market by dividing northern Seoul from southern 
Seoul. 
4  Kookmin bank’s homepage address is http://kbstar.com. Learning Effect of Housing Policies        163 
 
 
Also, with respect to the findings of Fama and French (1989), DEFAULT, 
defined by the difference between the yield of BAA and AAA rated bonds, 
tracks  long  term  business  cycles  and  TERM,  defined  by  the  differences 
between the yield of a 10-year T-bond and three-month T-bill, refers to short-
term business cycles. 
 
DEFAULT  captures  the  effects  of  returns  on  unexpected  changes  in  risk 
premia and on average, should be zero in a risk neutral world. It is generally 
introduced that DEFAULT is considered as a measure of the degree of risk 
aversion. We recognize that DEFAULT would reflect unexpected movement 
in the level of risk aversion and in pricing real estate. 
 
To calculate TERM, three-month T-bill (10-year T-bond) is replaced with 92-
day certificate of deposit (5-year government bond) in Korea to guarantee the 
liquidity of bonds. TERM is the calculation of unexpected returns on long 
bonds. 
 
It is frequently mentioned that OP has to be included in systematic variables 
that  are  influential  to  Korean  economic  conditions.  To  examine  this  and 
substitutes for economic factors, we obtain the monthly time series of the oil 
price (OP) in the logarithmic form offered by the Bank of Korea (Chen, Roll, 
and Ross (1986)). 
 
EXCHANGE  is  a  representative  variable  of  the  Korean  economy  in 
consideration of exports and imports. In the same manner as the findings from 
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), in this article, INFLATION is taken from the 
data set offered by the Bank of Korea. We expect that INFLATION has a 
positive  effect  on  the  elements  of  increase  in  the  prices  of  the  apartment 
market for the purpose of hedging risk.   
 
2.2  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of Individual Markets 
 
Figure  1  plots  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns (CARs)  in  northern  and 
southern Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggido. This figure shows the cumulative 
effects of abnormal returns in the local apartment market. In comparison to 
other apartment markets in the national capital region, the cumulative effect of 
abnormal returns on apartment assets in southern Seoul is almost the largest 
for  the  sample  period.  After  1999,  the  CAR  in  southern  Seoul  becomes 
positive  and  dramatically  increases  until  2006.  It  appears  likely  that  the 
cumulative effect of abnormal returns on apartments in southern Seoul has 
turned  out  to  be  larger  than  the  total  apartment  market  since  the  Asian 
financial crisis, owing to strong policies of stabilization in 2006, especially   
CARs  in  southern  Seoul  which  greatly  declined  in  comparison  to  other 
markets.  In  contrast  to  apartment  assets  in  southern  Seoul,  the  CAR  in 
apartment assets in northern Seoul decreased until July 2006, and then grew 
sharply, but is still negative. Even though northern Seoul and southern Seoul 164        Kim and Kim 
 
 
comprise the city of Seoul, their progress is obviously different from each 
other after the Asian financial crisis.         Instead of the total market, territories 





Figure 1  Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) in the National Capital 
Region. 
This figure illustrates the results of CARs in the national capital region. We 
cumulate the differences between raw returns in the individual markets and 
returns in the total market, and then we can ensure the cumulative effect of 
individual local markets.  ∑ = − =
t
t m,t i,t i,t R R CAR
1
, where, CARi,t = CAR 
for the local housing market i, month t; Ri,t = raw return for local housing 
market i, month t; Rm,t = return for month t for the total housing market m. The 





Figure 2 graphs the CAR in localities (Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, and Ulsan) 
from 1986 through to 2009. In contrast with the national capital region, except 
for the CAR in Daejeon, the rest were positive until the early 1990s, then 
turned  largely  downwards.    The  CAR  in  Busan  has  exceptional  increases 
until December 1990, but has also persistently decreased for the following 
approximate  18  years.  For  the  entire  period,  the  CAR  in  Busan  has  the 
greatest  CAR  in  the  localities,  that  is,  the  magnitude  of  CAR  in  Busan 
compared to the localities is the largest. The CAR in Busan was positive until 
2004, and then afterwards, became negative and rapidly shrunk. The degree of 
decline for Daejeon is the greatest among the large cities until 2003, but new 
events, such as construction of a capital city in Daejeon caused the CAR in the 
                                                       
5  Due to the lack of observation, the time series of Gyeonggido starts from July 2003. Learning Effect of Housing Policies        165 
 
 
Daejeon  apartment  market  to  rise  sharply,  but  this  was  short  lived.  As  a 
secondary effect of the economic panic from the financial tsunami crisis, the 
CAR in Gwangju dropped sharply until 2009, which meant that the Gwangju 
market had the worst cumulative effect of anomalies in comparison to other 
markets  beginning  2003.  Before  and  after  the  financial  panic,  Gwangu 
businesses looked down on other individual markets. Due to this, returns in 
Gwangu became increasingly poor. 
 
 
Figure 2  The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) in Localities. 
This figure graphs the results of CARs in localities (Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, 
Ulsan,  and  Gwangju).  We  cumulate  the  differences  between  raw  returns  in 
individual markets and returns in the total market, and by doing so; we can 
ensure  the  cumulative  effect  of  individual  local  markets. 
∑ = − =
t
t m,t i,t i,t R R CAR
1
, where, CARi,t = cumulative abnormal return for 
local housing market i, month t; Ri,t = raw return for local housing market i, 
month t; Rm,t = return for month t for the total housing market m. The sample 





2.3  The Characteristics of the Data Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows a summary of the statistics on returns in the national capital 
region and localities, and economic factors. Owing to a lack of observation for 
Gyeonggido, abnormal returns in Gyeonggido will be regressed from 2003 in 
this  work.  The  volatility  of  OP  is  the  largest  among  the  economic  state 
variables.   
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Table 1  Summary of the Statistics 
This table provides a summary of the statistics on returns in the national capital 
region and localities, and economic factors. Owing to a lack of observations for 
Gyeonggido, abnormal returns in Gyeonggido will be regressed from 2003 in 
this work. The sample period is from February 1986 to February 2009. 
Panel A  The National Capital Region         
  Northern 
Seoul 
Southern 
Seoul  Incheon  Gyeonggido       
Mean  -0.0002  0.0014  0.0001  0.0015       
Median  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0001       
Maximum  0.0356  0.0365  0.0437  0.0409       
Minimum  -0.0274  -0.0228  -0.0423  -0.0076       
Std. Dev.  0.0076  0.0081  0.0089  0.0067       
Observations  277  277  277  68       
Panel B  Localities         
  Busan  Daegu  Daejeon  Gwangju  Ulsan     
Mean  -0.0007  -0.0015  -0.0019  -0.0021  -0.0010    
Median  -0.0009  -0.0010  -0.0015  -0.0011  -0.0008    
Maximum  0.0552  0.0707  0.0717  0.0557  0.0335    
Minimum  -0.0370  -0.0406  -0.0545  -0.0459  -0.0666    
Std. Dev.  0.0098  0.0113  0.0129  0.0114  0.0115    
Observations  277  277  277  277  277    
Panel C  Economic Factors         
  Kospi  MSB  Term
6  Default  OP  Exchange  Inflation 
Mean  0.0075  0.099871  0.0060  0.0360  0.1831  0.0035  0.0308 
Median  0.0144  0.116800  0.0056  0.0372  0.1320  0.0007  0.0300 
Maximum  0.2245  0.187700  0.0233  0.0533  1.4070  0.3707  0.0740 
Minimum  -0.2631  0.025200  -0.0087  0.0214  -0.6280  -0.1662  -0.0030 
Std. Dev.  0.0776  0.046827  0.0063  0.0072  0.3651  0.0432  0.0151 
Observations  101  266  101  101  157  157  157 
 
 
Table  2  reports  the  results  of  the  unit  root  test  for  several  variables  that 
capture  the  variables  which  embrace  non-stationary  elements  to  provoke 
pseudo regression among proxies. It is well known that autocorrelation and 
seasonality embodied in state variables could lead to biased estimates of the 
loadings  on  variables.  These  could  bias  downward  the  significance  of 
variables. In Table 2, it seems likely that almost all of the variables are said to 
be stationary except for MSB, DEFAULT, and INFLATION since others are 
simply rejected at the 5% significance level which rest on the analysis with an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Phillips-Perron (PP) test under a 
null  hypothesis.  Since  MSB,  DEFAULT  and  INFLATION  (the  first-
differenced) are significantly rejected at the 1% level under a null hypothesis, 
                                                       
6  Due to the many financial crises in Korea, it is considered that the mean of the term 
shows a smaller number than the default. Learning Effect of Housing Policies        167 
 
 
they should be considered as differenced in the first level to become stationary 
economic  factors.  Therefore,  the  first-differenced  MSB,  DEFAULT,  and 
INFLATION will be exploited to explain abnormal returns in the apartment 
market in our analysis. 
 
 
Table 2  Unit Root Test 
This table displays whether the time series is stationary or not. An augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Philips Perron (PP) test is conducted for a unit 
root test under a null hypothesis. Economic factors are KOSPI, MSB, TERM, 
DEFAULT, OP, EXCHANGE, and INFLATION.  The sample period is from 
February 1986 to February 2009. 
Panel A  National Capital Region         
  Southern Seoul Northern Seoul  Incheon Gyeonggido     
ADF  -10.24  -11.86  -8.63  -3.52       
PP  -9.89  -11.76  -15.09  -3.45       
Panel B  Localities           
  Busan  Daegu  Daejeon  Gwangju  Ulsan    
ADF  -12.25  -8.20  -8.05  -11.56  -12.35    
PP  -12.77  -12.39  -11.74  -12.55  -11.99    
Panel C  Economic Factors         
  Kospi  MSB  Term  Default  Wti  Exchange  Inflation 
ADF  -15.23  -0.88  -3.27  -1.60  -3.85  -11.21  -2.39 
PP  -15.23  -0.66  -2.66  -1.79  -3.46  -11.14  -2.36 
    -11.25  -4.11  -7.80 
  -11.03  -3.99  -11.89 
 
 
Table 3 displays the correlation matrix for economic state variables. MSB, 
DEFAULT and INFLATION, which includes elements of non-stationary time 
series,  are  differenced  to  obtain  the  stationary  time  series.  The  strongest 
correlation  is  between  MSB  and  DEFAULT.  This  is  expected  because  to 
calculate DEFAULT, the yield of BAA rated bonds associated with MSB and 
the yield of AAA rated bonds related with MSB are exploited. Actually, the 
resulting multicollinearity shows a tendency to lessen the impacts of these 
proxies, but the impacts are not sufficient to qualitatively change the primary 
results in our findings. 
 
Term structure (TERM) and OP are correlated with each other, and TERM and 
INFLATION are strongly correlated. These correlated relations are a result of 
the reasons why OP and INFLATION are connected to interest rates. Many of 
the other correlations cannot be negligible, but it is hard to say that almost all 
variables  are  perfectly  correlated  with  each  other  and  no  variables  can  be 
replaced with any other one. 
 
 
 168        Kim and Kim 
 
 
Table 3  Correlation Matrix of Economic Factors 
This  table  proposes  a  correlation  matrix  of  economic  factors  to  explain 
abnormal returns in the apartment market. Economic factors are KOSPI, MSB, 
TERM, DEFAULT, OP, EXCHANGE, and INFLATION. The sample period is 
from February 1986 to February 2009. 
  KOSPI  MSB  TERM  DEFAULT  OP  EXCHANGE 
KOSPI             
MSB  0.049           
TERM  0.155  0.261         
DEFAULT  -0.062  -0.440  -0.138       
OP  -0.223  0.291  -0.360  -0.259     
EXCHANGE  0.048  -0.017  0.006  0.107  -0.128   
INFLATION  0.052  -0.096  -0.324  0.064  0.157  -0.053 
 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
In this  section, prior to full-scale estimation and to ensure that there exist 
anomalies aroused by the housing policies which are statistically significant, 
an  event  study  is  conducted.  In  the  sequential,  abnormal  returns  in  the 
individual apartment market are regressed (white heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance) on housing policy dummies in the case of 
finding relations between abnormal returns and housing policies. In contrast to 
previous papers, we have separated housing policies into two sub-sets, that is, 
revitalization and stabilization. Accordingly, in order to explain the parts with 
abnormal  returns  that  are  unrelated  to  housing  policies  in  the  individual 
market, economic state factors are exploited as independent variables. 
 
In real estate work, many researchers in practice have employed raw returns in 
the individual market without regard for abnormal returns when investigating 
the  traits  of  the  individual  market.  Actually,  it  is  well  known  that  the 
apartment  market  has  obvious  uniqueness  and  peculiarities  of  its  own  in 
comparison to other types of assets. Therefore, in this paper, the reason why 
we will apply a market adjusted model is to extract differences between raw 
returns in the distributive individual market and returns in the total market. 
Then, we can identify the anomalies of the individual market from the total 
market on the basis of this procedure. The definition of AR is as follows: 
m,t i,t i,t R R AR − =                                         (1) 
where ARi,t = abnormal return for individual apartment market i, month t; 
R i, t = raw return for individual apartment market i, month t; 
Rm, t = return for month t on the total apartment market m. 
 
A definition of CAR is as follows; 
∑ = − =
t
t m,t i,t i,t R R CAR
1                                           (2) 
where CARi t = cumulative abnormal return for local housing market i, month t; Learning Effect of Housing Policies        169 
 
 
Ri, t = raw return for local housing market i, month t; 
Rm, t = return for month t on the total housing market m. 
 
To examine whether the learning effect of housing policies is influential on 
anomalies  in  an  apartment  market,  abnormal  returns  were  estimated  by 
regressing  on  housing  policy  dummies.
7  In  general,  many  investors  have 
recognized that it is enough to maintain the learning effect of housing policies 
for five months in the market. For this reason, we assume that the learning 
effect of housing policies could exist for five months, so we set up the time 
interval  as  five  months.
8  This  is  highly  probable  because  the  explanatory 
power  of  regression  is  empirically  stronger  on  the  assumption  of  the 
persistence of the learning effect for five months. It is viable to classify the 
impacts of housing policies into two groups, which include the revitalization 
and  stabilization  of  the  housing  market.  Traditionally,  Korean  government 
policy makers have come up with such policies in order to control economic 
conditions because unlike other countries, the housing market ranks first in 
the  investment  of  asset  markets  rather  than  other  financial  asset  markets. 
Therefore, owing to these policies, the total asset markets in Korea undergo 
various influences. Additionally, given that among investors there is no belief 
that returns in the apartment market could be linked to the housing political 
announcements when they happen, a lagged estimation window is needed to 
be included as a dummy, which allows for the fact that prior housing policies 
are  considered  as  news,  hints  and  clues  about  political  announcements  to 














0 2 2 1 1           (3) 
where ARi,t = abnormal return for individual housing market i, month t; 
Dummy1,t
  =  if  the  housing  policy  to  revitalize  housing  market  is 
announced at time t, then Dummy1,t = 1, otherwise Dummy1,t
 = 0; 
Dummy2,t
 = if  the  housing  policy  to  stabilize  the  housing  market  is 
announced at time t, then Dummy2,t
 = 1, otherwise Dummy2,t = 0; 
α = constant term; 
β = the loadings on the dummies and state variables; and 
ε = idiosyncratic error term. 
 
In contrast to previous papers, in this thesis, we follow the housing policies 
suggested  by  Lee  et  al.  (2008). They  have  provided  the  principal  housing 
policies which were announced by the Korean government from 1970 through 
                                                       
7  In accordance to Henry (2000), we have set up dummy variables. 
8  Even  though  we  have  set  up  different  estimation  windows, the  results  are  still  not 
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to  2009.  By  virtue  of  the  report  written  by  Lee  et  al.  (2008),
9  we  will 
categorize the housing policies into two subsets, which are revitalization and 
stabilization.
10  The Korean government has traditionally announced housing 
policies in attempts to revitalize the housing market when the housing market 
was in the state of panic and to stabilize the housing market during an overly 
pumped economic boom. The following equation estimates the determinants 
of  abnormal  returns  by  adding  economic  factors.  Economic  factors  are 
mentioned in section II. 
t

















0 1 2 2 1 1     (4) 
where ARi,t = abnormal return for individual housing market i, month t; 
Dummy1,
 t
 = if  the  housing  policy  to  revitalize  the  housing  market  is 
announced at time t, then Dummy1,
 t = 1, otherwise Dummy1,
 t = 0; 
Dummy2,
 t
 = if  the  housing  policy  to  stabilize  the  housing  market  is 
announced at time t, then Dummy2,
 t
 = 1, otherwise Dummy2,
 t = 0; 
Xi, t-1 = economic factors;   
α = constant term; 
β = the loadings on the dummy and state variables; and 
ε = idiosyncratic error term. 
 
In previous literature, there have been various accounts which investigate the 
effects of real estate policies that use the vector autoregressive model (VAR). 
For example, many have been written by Jung     (2005), Jung (2007), Jo and 
Jung (2007), and Seo (2008). From the entire process in our study, we are able 
to  identify  a  VAR  and  find  unexpected  results  by  relying  on  the  response 
function  and  variance  decomposition  function.  However,  it  is  more 
meaningful and concrete to employ a single equation that can be examined 
immediately.  The  general  failure  of  accurately  filtering  out  biases  in 
independent variables is related to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
Given that monthly rates of return are mostly not serially uncorrelated in this 
work,  these  proxies  can  be  exploited  as  factors  without  any  specific 
corrections. Given the fact that there may exist serial correlations which are 
embodied in the factors, the differencing allows us to obtain the time series 
without  the  elements  of  serial  correlation,  then  we  regress  (white 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) abnormal returns 
in the individual apartment market on dummies and economic factors. These 
processes can moderate the errors caused by the model misspecification for 
examining the learning effect of housing policies.   
                                                       
9  This report is written by Lee, Kim, Park, Pyeon, and Chun in 2008. Their report 
which is published in the Korean Research institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) is 
titled “Development of System Dynamics Model for Housing Policy Impact Analysis”. 
10  As  evident  in  the  appendix,  we  have  tried  to  thoroughly  reflect  the  housing 
announcements by the government that are important to the Korean housing market 
and  based  on  the  reports;  we  have  carefully  categorized  the  announcements  to 
eliminate extraneous influences. Learning Effect of Housing Policies        171 
 
 
All lagged economic factors introduced in this thesis might have a significant 
predictive content for abnormal returns in the apartment market. Then, these 
will  be  exploited  to  explain  the  anomalies  in  the  apartment  market.  This 
approach  might  provide  an  antithetical  investigation,  which  is  to  find  the 
effects of exogenous economic factors on anomalies in the apartment market. 
In this article, the time subscripts of economic factors such as t-1 apply to the 
end of each month conditional on the applied information available at the end 
of month t-1, which is the standard period. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1  The Event Study 
 
We  found  interesting  results  from  testing  the  event  study  and  regressing 
(white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) abnormal 
returns in individual apartment markets which exploit dummy variables of the 
housing  policies  and  state  variables  in  this  section  according  to  apartment 
market, sample period, and size. 
 
Table 4 suggests the results of an event study of apartment market dwellings 
on housing policies broken into subsamples, such as national capital region 
and  localities.  We  examine  whether  there  are  abnormal  returns  in  the 
execution month (t = 0) or lagged months (t = 0 ~ t = -4), respectively, where 
announcing the housing policy is statistically significantly different from zero. 
The results of the event study offers evidence that abnormal returns in the 
apartment market in Incheon, Busan, and Ulsan on the implementation month 
(t = 0) are rejected, at a 10% percent significance level, significantly on the 
null of which an abnormal return is not different from zero. Also, it is found 
that abnormal returns in the  apartment  market in southern Seoul, Incheon, 
Busan, Daejeon, Gwangju, and Ulsan for lagged months (t = 0 ~ t = -4) are 
significantly  different  from  zero.  It  seems  likely  that  these  suggest  the 
possibility that there are significant apartment market anomalies which have 
brought about a learning effect from the housing policies. From this analysis, 
we  will  propose  the  outcomes  of  regression  which  adopt  lagged  dummy 
variables to find the learning effect. 
 
4.2  The Learning Effect of Housing Policies 
 
Table 5 reports the results in which the learning effect has an influence on 
anomalies in the individual apartment market in the national capital region. 
The main result from Table 5 is that there exists different learning effects from 
the housing policies to anomalies by means of territory and estimation period, 
but this learning effect does not continuously persist. Furthermore, the striking 
result is that, in contrary to the aim of the housing policies, the estimated sign 




11  which  means  that  investors  reversely  respond  to  the 
housing  policies  in  the  national  capital.
12  This  can  be  interpreted  that 
investors have private information or understand the policies differently. 
 
 
Table 4  An Event Study of the Housing Market 
This  table  shows  the  results  of  an  event  study  on  the  basis  of  the  housing 
policies. Panels A and B display the consequences of the national capital region 
(localities) for an estimation window where t = 0, and t = 0 ~ t = - 4. The 
sample  period  starts  in 1986  and  ends  in  2009.  Bolded  characters  represent 
significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level. 
Panel A  National Capital Region       
  Northern Seoul Southern Seoul  Incheon  Gyeonggido  
t=0  -0.070511  0.9648674  1.8398598  -0.112816   
t=0,-1,-2,-3,-4  -0.897067  2.648666  1.647286  0.7637312   
Panel B  Localities       
  Busan  Daegu  Daejeon  Gwangju  Ulsan 
t=0  -2.099237  -0.818693  -0.590878  -1.37124  -1.851262 
t=0,-1,-2,-3,-4  -1.811292  -1.431438  -1.65527  -3.378029  -2.847309 
 
 
In contrast to the period from 2000 to 2009, the explanatory power of the 
learning  effect  in  the  sample  period  from  1986-1999  is  stronger  with  the 
exception of northern Seoul. All of this creates the sense that, recently, the 
effectiveness of the learning effect in the housing policies has become weaker. 
Therefore, we can argue that there is a somewhat likelihood that abnormal 
returns  in  an  apartment  market  could  be  explained  by  other  factors 
simultaneously and jointly. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of whether the learning effect could affect anomalies 
in apartment assets in localities which exploit housing policy dummies for 
four lagged months. The principal results of Table 6 are that, similar to the 
national capital region, it appears likely there are learning effects, but these 
are not persistent in the entire sample period. The astonishing findings are that 
in contrast to the national capital areas, local areas follow the intentions of the 
housing policies mostly in the entire sample period at a 5% significance level 
expect for Gwangju.
13  Namely, it would be very likely that the estimated sign 
of  dummy  variables  in  Table  6  are  consistent  with  the  anticipated  sign  of 
dummy variables determined in section II. However, in the case of Gwangju, 
                                                       
11  At a 10% significance level, the results do not particularly change. The result of 
northern Seoul is somewhat weaker for 1986-1999. 
12  In section II, dummies1 and 2 are based on the housing policies that revitalize and 
stabilize the apartment market, respectively, so the anticipated sign of dummies 1 and 2 
will be positive and negative, respectively. 
13  The results do not change much at a 10 % significance level. Learning Effect of Housing Policies        173 
 
 
whenever  housing  policies  are  mentioned,  abnormal  returns  significantly 
become negative, so that anomalies in the Gwangju market is demonstrated to 
be negatively related to the housing policies more than the total market. 
 
 
Table 5  The Learning Effect of Housing Policies in the National Capital 
Region 
This table provides the results in which abnormal returns in the national capital 
region  are  regressed  (white  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  and 
covariance) on lagged dummy variables of the housing policies. The sample 
period in panels A and B begins with 1986 and 2000, respectively, and ends in 
1999  and  2009,  respectively.  Bolded  characters  imply  rejection  due  to  a 
significance level under 5%. 
Panel A  1986 – 1999             
  Northern Seoul  Southern Seoul  Incheon     
Variable  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.     
Constant  -0.001  -1.536  -0.001 -1.825  -0.001 -0.715     
DUMMY1  0.001  0.521  -0.005 -1.365  0.005 1.220     
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.001  -0.265  0.006 1.517  -0.002 -0.471     
DUMMY1(-2)  -0.003  -1.312  0.003 1.111  0.003 1.047     
DUMMY1(-3)  0.000  0.060  0.014 2.520  -0.014 -3.078     
DUMMY1(-4)  0.004  1.950  -0.003 -0.704  0.007 1.386     
DUMMY2  -0.001  -0.330  0.008 2.871  -0.004 -1.114     
DUMMY2(-1)  -0.001  -0.523  0.001 0.324  0.007 2.246     
DUMMY2(-2)  -0.001  -0.490  0.003 1.188  -0.010 -1.960     
DUMMY2(-3)  0.001  0.266  -0.003 -0.949  0.008 2.578     
DUMMY2(-4)  0.006  1.440  0.002 0.552  -0.004 -1.367     
R
2  0.043    0.184   0.169      
Panel B  2000 – 2009             
  Northern Seoul  Southern Seoul  Incheon  Gyeonggido 
Variable  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat. 
Constant  0.003  2.960  0.003 3.321  0.001  0.888  0.001  1.467 
DUMMY1  -0.001  -0.397  -0.002 -0.660  0.004  1.761  -0.003 -2.490 
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.001  -0.936  0.000 -0.030  0.003  0.821  -0.001 -0.659 
DUMMY1(-2)  0.000  -0.184  -0.004 -1.340  0.001  0.265  -0.001 -0.313 
DUMMY1(-3)  0.000  0.064  0.000 -0.217  0.001  0.361  -0.004 -2.897 
DUMMY1(-4)  -0.003  -1.544  -0.004 -1.758  0.002  0.672  -0.003 -1.852 
DUMMY2  0.000  -0.149  0.006 2.324  -0.001  -0.801  0.006  1.347 
DUMMY2(-1)  -0.001  -0.259  0.000 -0.070  0.000  0.138  0.004  1.687   
DUMMY2(-2)  -0.001  -0.705  -0.003 -1.079  0.000  -0.093  0.001  0.538 
DUMMY2(-3)  -0.003  -1.970  -0.002 -0.686  0.001  0.716  -0.002 -0.926 
DUMMY2(-4)  -0.003  -1.917  0.003 0.957  -0.001  -0.540  -0.002 -1.028 
R
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Table 6  The Learning Effect of Housing Policies in Localities 
This table depicts the results of the housing policies in localities which exploit 
the lagged dummy variables. Abnormal returns in the metropolis in localities are 
regressed (white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) on 
lagged dummy variables of the housing policies. The sample period of panels A 
and B begins with 1986 and 2000, respectively, and ends in 1999 and 2009, 
respectively. Bolded characters imply rejection due to a significance level under 
5%. 
Panel A  Localities                   
  Busan.  Daegu.  Daejeon.  Gwangju.  Ulsan. 
Variable  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat. 
Constant  0.000  0.281  0.000  0.230 -0.001 -0.855  0.001  1.133  0.001  0.881 
DUMMY1  0.003  0.808  0.009  3.291  0.004  1.252  0.007  1.339 -0.004 -0.384 
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.005 -1.763  0.000  0.077  0.008  1.526 -0.010 -2.375 -0.014 -1.113 
DUMMY1(-2)  0.001  0.590  0.005  0.917  0.005  1.262 -0.001 -0.457 -0.008 -0.946 
DUMMY1(-3)  -0.005 -0.992 -0.007 -2.142  0.001  0.315 -0.012 -2.743  0.000  0.044 
DUMMY1(-4)  0.002  0.805  0.006  1.623 -0.003 -0.872  0.005  1.040  0.006  0.841 
DUMMY2  -0.003 -0.500 -0.012 -2.837 -0.009 -1.973 -0.014 -4.116 -0.011 -1.877 
DUMMY2(-1)  0.000 -0.082 -0.006 -1.788  0.003  0.560 -0.005 -1.879 -0.005 -1.178 
DUMMY2(-2)  0.001  0.217 -0.006 -1.349 -0.004 -0.636 -0.003 -0.571 -0.003 -0.762 
DUMMY2(-3)  0.006  1.018 -0.002 -0.631 -0.007 -1.193 -0.001 -0.241 -0.003 -0.836 
DUMMY2(-4)  0.000 -0.107  0.000 -0.023 -0.006 -1.699 -0.008 -2.071  0.001  0.105 
R
2  0.027    0.113    0.085    0.152    0.105   
Panel B  Localities                 
  Busan  Daegu  Daejeon  Gwangju  Ulsan 
Variable  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat.  Coef.  t-Stat. 
Constant  -0.002 -2.907  -0.003 -3.631  -0.004 -3.590  -0.003 -2.946  -0.001 -1.210 
DUMMY1  0.003 1.417  0.002 1.018  0.000 0.043  0.001 0.409  0.000 0.063 
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.002 -0.619  0.002 1.428  -0.001 -0.226  -0.001 -0.241  -0.004 -0.899 
DUMMY1(-2)  0.005 1.817  -0.001 -0.687  0.001 0.426  0.001 0.330  0.006 3.244 
DUMMY1(-3)  0.000 0.040  0.001 0.383  0.003 1.034  0.000 0.100  0.001 0.229 
DUMMY1(-4)  0.007 3.017  0.002 1.549  0.006 2.129  0.002 0.623  -0.002 -0.914 
DUMMY2  -0.005 -2.004  -0.003 -1.156  -0.001 -0.134  -0.005 -1.630  -0.006 -3.806 
DUMMY2(-1)  -0.001 -0.337  0.001 0.459  0.001 0.247  -0.002 -0.678  -0.003 -2.007 
DUMMY2(-2)  0.003 1.484  0.001 0.662  -0.001 -0.427  0.001 0.547  0.004 2.324 
DUMMY2(-3)  0.001 0.656  0.003 1.505  0.004 0.841  0.001 0.508  0.004 1.624 
DUMMY2(-4)  -0.002 -1.215  -0.002 -0.930  0.007 1.634  -0.001 -0.545  0.000 -0.035 
R
2.  0.220    0.101    0.097    0.076    0.241 
 
 
Table 7 offers the results in which anomalies across the size of apartment 
assets are associated with the learning effect at a 5% significance level; under 
the 10% level, the results are not different. Resting on the results of Table 7, 
for the period of 1986-1999 in panel A, the housing policies on stabilization 
do not have learning effects on the size of apartment assets because almost all 
anomalies  respond  mostly  in  the  month  when  the  housing  policies  are 
announced. Abnormal returns react contrary to the intentions of the housing 
policies to stabilize the apartment market; investors in the apartment market Learning Effect of Housing Policies        175 
 
 
have different interpretations of the aim of the housing policies or have non-
publicized information about the policies. It is unlikely that abnormal returns 
are positively associated with the purpose of the housing policies to revitalize 
the apartment market for the sample period from 1986 to 1999, which implies 
that  investors  follow  the  goals  of  the  housing  policies,  but  there  are  no 
learning effects for 2000-2009.   
 
 
Table 7  The Learning Effect of Housing Policies Underlying on Size 
This table offers the outcomes of the learning effects of housing policies on size 
which  apply  lagged  dummy  variables.  Abnormal  returns  based  on  size  are 
regressed (white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) 
on  lagged  dummy  variables  of  the  housing  policies.  The  sample  period  is 
broken into two sub periods, 1986-1999 (Panel A), and 2000-2009 (Panel B). 
Bolded characters imply rejection due to a significance level under 5%. 
Panel A  1986 - 1999           
  Large  Medium  Small 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  0.000    0.640    0.000    -0.196    0.001    1.174   
DUMMY  -0.002    -1.218    -0.002    -1.345    -0.003    -1.684   
DUMMY(-1)  0.004    1.510    0.004    1.931    0.003    1.875   
DUMMY(-2)  -0.002    -1.522    0.000    0.114    -0.001    -0.439   
DUMMY1(-3)  0.006    3.352    0.004    2.232    0.004    2.035   
DUMMY1(-4)  0.001    0.256    -0.001    -0.291    -0.003    -1.615   
DUMMY2  0.005    2.076    0.006    3.294    0.007    2.884   
DUMMY2(-1)  0.002    1.168    0.002    0.998    0.001    0.836   
DUMMY2(-2)  0.002    0.607    0.004    1.854    0.003    1.377   
DUMMY2(-3)  0.003    1.789    0.000    -0.345    -0.001    -0.926   
DUMMY2(-4)  0.002    1.019    0.002    0.649    0.002    0.973   
R
2  0.124      0.147      0.161     
Panel B  2000 - 2009           
  Large  Medium  Small 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  0.001    3.033    0.001    2.413    0.001    2.310   
DUMMY  -0.001    -1.436    0.000    0.365    0.000    -0.142   
DUMMY(-1)  -0.001    -0.831    0.000    0.036    0.001    0.603   
DUMMY(-2)  -0.001    -0.372    0.000    -0.070    0.000    0.171   
DUMMY1(-3)  -0.001    -0.900    0.000    0.351    0.000    0.006   
DUMMY1(-4)  -0.002    -0.955    -0.001    -0.816    -0.001    -0.842   
DUMMY2  0.004    3.408    0.003    3.763    0.002    2.999   
DUMMY2(-1)  0.003    2.845    0.002    1.944    0.001    1.045   
DUMMY2(-2)  0.001    0.602    0.000    0.021    0.000    -0.638   
DUMMY2(-3)  -0.001    -1.259    0.000    -0.227    0.000    -0.267   
DUMMY2(-4)  0.001    1.019    0.001    1.492    0.001    1.366   
R
2  0.327      0.292      0.192     
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4.3    The Learning Effect of Housing Policies with Economic Factors 
 
Table  8  presents  the  anomalies  in  apartment  markets  that  are  related 
differently to the housing policies by adding economic state variables in the 
national capital region. In Panel A, the reason why only the return on stock 
market portfolio (KOSPI), MSB, and INFLATION are used as independent 
variables is that the rest of the variables were not available until 1996. On the 
whole, the explanatory power increases with the addition of economic state 
variables  in  comparison  to  Table  5.  This  implies  that  when  estimating 
anomalies in the apartment market, it is essential to not consider dummy and 
economic state variables at the same time. Notwithstanding  supplementing 
economic  state  variables,  we  confirm  there  are  no  distinct  changes  in  the 
results  mentioned  in  Table  5  when  taking  into  account  the  coefficients  on 
dummy variables in Table 8.
14 
 
In order to examine the influence of the stock market, KOSPI is added as the 
right-hand-side variable, but the explanatory power of KOSPI has nothing to 
do  with  the  anomalies  for  all  of  the  national  capital  market  in  the  entire 
sample  period.  To  test  the  impacts  of  interest  rates,  MSB  is  added  as  an 
independent variable, but no coefficients on MSB are significant in the entire 
sample period for the entire national capital market. Overall, INFLATION is 
insignificant in the entire period except for the Incheon market; this suggests 
that hedging by inflation is available only in the Incheon apartment market for 
2000-2009. Moreover, EXCHANGE which is created by external risk is not 
significant in the entire national capital market. This is read in the context 
where anomalies in the apartment market are not related with world-wide risk. 
 
As for TERM, the negative risk premium implies that the return on assets is 
reversely associated with rises in the long term rate over the short term rate. 
This is because TERM examines the changes in the long-term rate of interest. 
Investors will place a great deal of weight on assets when long term rates 
decline  and  such  assets  include  negative  risk  premiums.  Thus,  assets  are 
correlated with long-term bond returns. Both southern Seoul and Incheon have 
significant coefficients on TERM, but their signs are different from each other. 
Only DEFAULT has negatively significant anomalies in the southern Seoul 
market; this can be understood that without the function of hedge assets, the 
distress risk causes downward abnormal returns in the apartment market in 
southern Seoul.   
 
                                                       
14  Rather, the number of significant dummy variables rise somewhat and the sign of 











































Table 8  The Learning Effect of Housing Policies which Exploit Economic Factors in the National Capital Region 
This  table  illustrates  the  consequences  of  the  learning  effect  by  applying  lagged  dummy  variables  of  the  housing  policies  and 
macroeconomic variables. Abnormal returns in the capital region are regressed (white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance) on lagged dummy variables of the housing policies and economic state variables. The sample period is broken into two sub 
periods, 1987-1999 (Panel A), and 2000-2009 (Panel B). Bolded characters imply rejection because the significance level is under 5%. 
Panel A  1987 - 1999 
  Northern Seoul  Southern Seoul  Incheon 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  -0.001    -1.733    -0.001    -1.890    0.000    0.118   
DUMMY1  0.000    0.000    -0.003    -0.836    0.004    0.941   
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.001    -0.331    0.006    1.328    -0.005    -1.154   
DUMMY1(-2)  -0.003    -1.188    0.001    0.234    0.006    1.713   
DUMMY1(-3)  -0.001    -0.498    0.013    2.262    -0.013    -2.976   
DUMMY1(-4)  0.004    1.153    -0.005    -0.798    0.014    2.610   
DUMMY2  -0.001    -0.353    0.009    2.868    -0.005    -1.268   
DUMMY2(-1)  0.000    -0.149    0.001    0.538    0.006    1.796   
DUMMY2(-2)  -0.001    -0.261    0.003    1.177    -0.011    -2.140   
DUMMY2(-3)  0.001    0.282    -0.002    -0.779    0.008    2.139   
DUMMY2(-4)  0.006    1.554    0.002    0.582    -0.004    -1.422   
KOSPI(-1)  -0.011    -1.063    0.012    1.352    -0.010    -1.135   
MSB(-1)  -0.181    -1.334    -0.121    -0.981    0.063    0.474   
INFLATION(-1)  -0.114    -0.733    -0.029    -0.193    0.166    0.891   
R
2  0.069      0.214      0.208     
(Continued…) 






















(Table 8 Continued) 
Panel B  2000 - 2009   
  Northern Seoul  Southern Seoul  Incheon  Gyeonggido 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  0.006    2.907    0.004    2.171    0.004    2.587    0.005    1.645   
DUMMY1  -0.001    -0.387    0.001    0.326    0.003    0.819    -0.001    -0.324   
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.002    -1.099    0.000    0.246    0.003    0.846    -0.002    -1.552   
DUMMY1(-2)  -0.001    -0.344    -0.003    -1.661    0.000    0.033    -0.001    -0.663   
DUMMY1(-3)  -0.002    -0.660    -0.003    -1.059    -0.002    -0.402    -0.006    -2.273   
DUMMY1(-4)  -0.005    -1.867    -0.007    -2.531    0.002    0.555    -0.001    -0.774   
DUMMY2  0.000    0.215    0.006    2.385    0.000    -0.035    0.007    1.521   
DUMMY2(-1)  0.000    -0.075    -0.002    -0.680    0.000    0.240    0.004    1.451   
DUMMY2(-2)  -0.001    -0.440    -0.004    -1.512    0.001    0.322    0.001    0.371   
DUMMY2(-3)  -0.003    -2.002    -0.003    -1.282    0.001    0.474    -0.002    -0.811   
DUMMY2(-4)  -0.003    -2.001    -0.001    -0.199    -0.002    -0.974    -0.002    -0.914   
KOSPI(-1)  -0.008    -0.873    0.011    0.858    -0.010    -1.202    -0.006    -0.584   
MSB(-1)  0.399    1.077    -0.368    -0.945    0.240    0.655    0.164    0.462   
TERM(-1)  -0.274    -1.687    0.329    2.111    -0.238    -1.960    -0.243    -1.358   
DEFAULT(-1)  0.277    0.668    -1.078    -2.199    -0.360    -0.700    -0.984    -1.788   
OP(-1)  -0.006    -1.914    -0.008    -2.468    -0.006    -2.318    -0.008    -1.728   
EXCHANGE(-1)  -0.018    -1.356    0.001    0.043    -0.008    -0.937    0.000    -0.047   
INF(-1)  0.375    1.088    0.250    0.636    0.708    2.269    0.323    0.969   
R
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Moreover, OP is frequently pointed out as an essential economic factor even 
though there is no evidence that OP should have the same extent of impact as 
for instance, interest rates. Table 8 reports that OP is significant at the 5% and 
10% levels in all apartment markets. This is because OP is a predictor of the 
Korean economy as it was an important raw material in the Korean industry 
which had a strong impact on anomalies in the entire national capital market 
from 2000 to 2009.   
 
Even though economic factors are included in the analysis, the main results of 
Table 9 are analogous to those of Table 6.
15  The coefficient on DEFAULT in 
the Busan apartment market for 2000-2009 is only positively significant at 
variance with southern Seoul (negatively significant). In the case of the results 
in  Busan,  DEFAULT  tracking  of  long-term  businesses  has  a  positive  risk 
premia because investors in Busan try to hedge against unexpected increases 
in  risk  premia;  they  require  more  return  as  compensation  on  DEFAULT. 
Anomalies  in  the  Busan  apartment  market  is  positively  related  with  MSB 
which determined the discounted rates from 1987 through to 1999. In Table 9, 
OP is at a 5% and 10 % positively significant level in all localities for 2000-
2009. Hence, in counterpoint to the national capital region, OP gives rise to 
increases in abnormal returns in localities. This can be construed in such a 
way  that  investors  in  localities  consider  apartment  assets  as  the  way  of 
hedging  a  price  increase  by  OP.  Furthermore,  INFLATION  is  negatively 
related to abnormal returns in the Daegu market, which lends that apartment 
assets  do  not  significantly  hedge  inflation.  Moreover,  TERM  is  positively 
significant to anomalies in the Daegu market, in which as long term interest 
rates increase, the returns in the Daegu apartment market also increase. The 
returns  on  the  market  portfolio  and  interest  rates  do  not  have  significant 
effects on anomalies in localities for the whole period. 
 
Table  10  provides  evidence  where  the  housing  policies  influence  the 
anomalies differently in the apartment market across size of apartment. The 
result in Table 10 is consistent with the result in Table 7 which shows that 
there is a learning effect which forms the basis for size.
16  We are sure that if 
economic factors are added into the model, the explanatory power increases, 
then this can be said that not only the dummies of the housing policies, but 
also economic state factors should be jointly considered when investigating 
the effects of housing policies. Consistent with the former results, OP is a very 
important factor that explains anomalies in the apartment market across the 
size of apartment assets.   
 
                                                       
15  Preferably, the explanatory power of Table 9 is better than Table 6. 






















Table 9  The Learning Effect of Housing Policies by Adding Economic Factors in Localities 
This table proposes the outcomes of the learning effect by applying lagged dummy variables of the housing policies and economic factors. 
Abnormal  returns  on  localities  are  regressed  (white  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  Errors  and  covariance)  on  lagged  dummy 
variables of the housing policies and economic state variables. The sample period is broken into two sub periods, 1987-1999 (Panel A), and 
2000-2009 (Panel B). Bolded characters imply rejection due to a significance level that is under 5%. 
Panel A  1987 - 1999     
  Busan  Daegu  Daejeon  Gwangju  Ulsan 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant  0.000    0.113    0.000    0.125    -0.001    -0.571    0.001    0.848    0.001    0.791   
DUMMY1  0.004    0.947    0.008    2.803    0.003    0.700    0.007    1.319    -0.003    -0.221   
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.004    -1.156    -0.003    -0.483    0.008    1.558    -0.011    -2.433    -0.010    -0.887   
DUMMY1(-2)  0.004    1.108    0.007    1.189    0.005    1.066    -0.002    -0.554    -0.018    -1.590   
DUMMY1(-3)  -0.002    -0.400    -0.010    -2.390    0.002    0.538    -0.014    -2.612    0.006    0.657   
DUMMY1(-4)  0.001    0.366    0.008    1.702    -0.004    -0.713    0.005    0.769    -0.001    -0.075   
DUMMY2  -0.002    -0.423    -0.012    -2.826    -0.009    -2.000    -0.014    -3.986    -0.012    -2.011   
DUMMY2(-1)  -0.002    -0.526    -0.005    -1.671    0.002    0.483    -0.004    -1.384    -0.006    -1.238   
DUMMY2(-2)  0.000    0.070    -0.005    -1.404    -0.004    -0.619    -0.003    -0.515    -0.001    -0.370   
DUMMY2(-3)  0.007    1.121    0.000    -0.149    -0.008    -1.340    0.000    -0.028    -0.005    -1.017   
DUMMY2(-4)  -0.001    -0.204    0.000    -0.037    -0.006    -1.645    -0.007    -1.894    0.002    0.358   
KOSPI(-1)  0.011    1.004    -0.012    -1.176    -0.008    -0.477    -0.002    -0.177    0.018    1.513   
MSB(-1)  0.477    2.710    0.133    0.756    -0.117    -0.494    -0.098    -0.423    -0.029    -0.170   
INFLATION(-1)  0.001    0.004    -0.525    -1.849    0.191    0.641    -0.162    -0.452    0.469    1.758   
R
2  0.088      0.158      0.100      0.151      0.178     
(Continued…) 











































(Table 9 Continued) 
Panel B  2000 - 2009   
  Busan  Daegu  Daejeon  Gwangju  Ulsan 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant  -0.005    -2.106    -0.007    -3.074    -0.007    -2.738    -0.007    -3.156    -0.003    -1.784   
DUMMY1  0.002    0.909    0.001    0.646    -0.001    -0.331    -0.001    -0.251    0.000    -0.158   
DUMMY1(-1)  -0.002    -0.890    0.002    1.138    -0.002    -0.518    -0.001    -0.398    -0.004    -0.856   
DUMMY1(-2)  0.006    1.985    0.001    0.605    0.001    0.254    0.001    0.417    0.005    2.786   
DUMMY1(-3)  0.000    0.134    0.006    2.309    0.005    1.253    0.004    0.964    0.000    0.116   
DUMMY1(-4)  0.007    1.963    0.003    1.500    0.009    2.278    0.004    1.162    -0.001    -0.494   
DUMMY2  -0.006    -2.156    -0.005    -1.609    -0.002    -0.466    -0.005    -1.753    -0.006    -3.681   
DUMMY2(-1)  0.000    0.051    0.001    0.362    0.000    0.129    0.000    -0.105    -0.002    -1.377   
DUMMY2(-2)  0.003    1.796    0.000    0.148    -0.001    -0.422    0.002    0.842    0.005    2.433   
DUMMY2(-3)  0.002    1.363    0.003    1.438    0.004    0.943    0.003    1.050    0.005    2.172   
DUMMY2(-4)  0.000    0.054    -0.001    -0.406    0.009    1.896    0.002    0.702    0.002    0.860   
KOSPI(-1)  -0.006    -0.650    0.011    0.965    -0.021    -1.072    0.000    -0.007    -0.006    -0.759   
MSB(-1)  -0.120    -0.398    0.274    0.793    -0.040    -0.090    -0.153    -0.296    -0.546    -1.649   
TERM(-1)  0.016    0.075    0.355    2.247    0.173    0.800    -0.057    -0.257    -0.026    -0.224   
DEFAULT(-1)  1.056    2.563    0.706    1.557    0.748    1.188    0.822    1.476    0.106    0.191   
OP(-1)  0.005    1.662    0.008    2.163    0.009    2.180    0.014    3.666    0.005    2.438   
EXCHANGE(-1)  -0.007    -0.661    0.009    0.673    0.027    1.821    -0.002    -0.127    0.006    0.644   
INFLATION(-1)  -0.364    -1.023    -0.790    -2.748    -0.079    -0.158    -0.339    -0.946    -0.323    -1.013   
R
2  0.332      0.254      0.197      0.281      0.344     
 






















Table 10  The Learning Effect of Housing Policies Forms the Basis for Size by Adding Economic Factors 
This table presents the results of the learning effect by drawing on size which exploits lagged dummy variables of the housing policies and 
economic state variables. Abnormal returns across size are regressed (white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance) 
on lagged dummy variables of the housing policies and economic fundamentals based on size. The sample period is broken into two sub 
periods, 1987-1999 (Panel A), and 2000-2009 (Panel B). Bolded characters imply rejection due to a significance level which is lower than 
5%. 
Panel A  1987 - 1999           
  Large  Medium  Small 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  0.001  1.378  0.000  -0.152  0.001  1.442 
DUMMY  -0.001  -0.704  -0.002  -0.906  -0.002  -1.424 
DUMMY(-1)  0.003  1.252  0.003  1.648  0.003  1.535 
DUMMY(-2)  -0.003  -1.351  -0.001  -0.471  -0.001  -0.765 
DUMMY1(-3)  0.006  3.117  0.003  1.402  0.003  1.542 
DUMMY1(-4)  0.001  0.351  -0.001  -0.314  -0.003  -1.211 
DUMMY2  0.005  1.920  0.006  3.172  0.007  2.788 
DUMMY2(-1)  0.002  0.925  0.002  1.134  0.002  0.897 
DUMMY2(-2)  0.001  0.394  0.004  1.821  0.003  1.308 
DUMMY2(-3)  0.003  1.599  0.000  -0.094  -0.001  -0.848 
DUMMY2(-4)  0.002  0.753  0.002  0.656  0.002  0.935 
KOSPI(-1)  0.007  0.964  0.005  0.905  0.003  0.502 
MSB(-1)  0.110  0.985  -0.064  -0.568  -0.041  -0.558 
INFLATION(-1)  -0.073  -0.721  -0.069  -0.691  -0.029  -0.268 
R
2  0.140    0.157    0.158   
(Continued…) 











































(Table 10 Continued) 
Panel B  2000 - 2009           
  Large  Medium  Small 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  0.001  1.351  0.001  1.970  0.001  1.013 
DUMMY  0.000  -0.184  0.001  1.104  0.000  -0.070 
DUMMY(-1)  -0.001  -0.685  0.000  0.285  0.001  0.965 
DUMMY(-2)  0.000  -0.236  0.000  0.135  0.001  0.862 
DUMMY1(-3)  -0.001  -1.102  -0.001  -0.676  -0.001  -0.792 
DUMMY1(-4)  -0.002  -1.202  -0.002  -1.258  -0.002  -2.137 
DUMMY2  0.004  3.359  0.003  3.891  0.002  3.056 
DUMMY2(-1)  0.003  2.156  0.001  1.316  0.000  0.635 
DUMMY2(-2)  0.000  0.064  0.000  -0.678  0.000  -0.651 
DUMMY2(-3)  -0.002  -1.622  -0.001  -0.959  0.000  -0.621 
DUMMY2(-4)  0.000  0.294  0.000  0.251  0.000  0.624 
KOSPI(-1)  0.005  1.001  0.005  1.645  0.001  0.440 
MSB(-1)  -0.132  -0.697  -0.072  -0.421  -0.039  -0.269 
TERM(-1)  0.126  1.488  0.092  1.288  0.084  1.352 
DEFAULT(-1)  -0.391  -1.503  -0.252  -1.455  -0.085  -0.519 
OP(-1)  -0.001  -0.626  -0.003  -2.988  -0.002  -2.062 
EXCHANGE(-1)  0.011  1.392  0.000  -0.102  -0.002  -0.645 
INFLATION(-1)  -0.155  -0.767  0.043  0.325  0.134  1.151 
R
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To summarize, investors who take part in investing on apartment assets in the 
national  capital  behave  differently  depending  on  several  factors,  which  is 
because  they  trade  apartment  assets  with  different  strategies  according  to 
areas, period, and size.   
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Our article sheds light on the evidence that the learning  effect of housing 
policies is related to anomalies in the Korean apartment market. Hence, in 
light of what has been said above, it is concluded that there is a learning effect 
that affects anomalies in the apartment market. This effect has different traits 
and  characteristics  depending  on  territory,  estimation  period,  and  size. 
Grounded  in  factors,  the  estimation  period,  location  and  size,  which  are 
important to the price of apartment assets, we investigate the existence and 
characteristics  of  the  learning  effect  of  housing  policies  on  anomalies  for 
apartment assets in Korea which exploit economic state variables. 
 
It is especially relevant that anomalies in the apartment market for the national 
capital show opposite responses to the  goal of the housing policies  which 
differs from localities. Viewed in this light, investors in the national capital 
market have private information when investing in apartments; this can be 
interpreted  that  they  are  more  sophisticated  traders  in  contrast  to  those  in 
localities. Moreover, anomalies in the apartment market which underlie size 
are  positively  linked  with  the  learning  effect  of  the  housing  policies  on 
revitalization,  but  these  are  negatively  linked  to  the  learning  effect  of  the 
housing policies on stabilization. Seen in this perspective, investors interpret 
the housing policies differently with regard to the size of the apartment assets. 
 
The most noticeable result linked by adding economic factors is that OP has 
the statistically strongest relevance to anomalies in the apartment market for 
the whole period. This is because oil is a representative Korean economic 
factor and an important raw material. Not all economic variables included in 
the data set in this paper are significant to anomalies in the apartment market. 
As expected, the significance of economic state variables depends on area, 
period, and size, which seems plausible as apartment assets have their own 
uniqueness  and  characteristics  in  comparison  to  other  types  of  assets  and 
investors. This evidence suggests that investors in the apartment market need 
to  consider  different  strategies  with  regards  to  area,  period  and  size  when 
trading apartment assets. 
 
Whenever the Korean government mentions housing policies, it leaves much 
room  for  consideration  of  the  learning  effect  on  anomalies  and  economic 
factors in the apartment market with regards to time period, location, and size. 
Our article defines the boundaries which are needed to control the relationship 
between internal and external economic state variables. Unfortunately, there Learning Effect of Housing Policies        185 
 
 
might be the possibility of selection bias in the economic factors in this work. 
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Appendix 1: Important Housing Policies and their Details in the 1980s 
Year  The Principal Policies  Contents of Policy 
9.16 policy  1. A reduction in the housing sales tax (5%-20%) 
2. Large-scale low cost housing construction  1980 
12.13 policy  1.Introduction of flexible housing sales tax rates 
1981  6.26 policy  1.Easing of the housing sales tax 
2.Partial removal of controlled housing prices 
1.14 policy 
1. Extension of flexible housing sales tax adoption 
2. Improvement of housing funds and finances 
3. Real property acquisition tax cut (30%) 
4. Extension of unsold housing supply  1982 
12.22 policy  1. Differential pricing of sold housing 
2. Prohibition of resale for 2 years 
2.16 policy 
1. Housing sales tax based on sale price of 
apartment. 
2. A brokerage license system 
3. The bond bidding system 
4.18 policy  1. Spread of residential land development 
2. Reduction in flexible housing sales tax adoption 
1983 
9.5 policy 
1. Notice of the metropolitan area 
2.Computerization of actual conditions of land 
possession 
1985  5.20 policy 
1. Induction of an integrated land tax system 
2. Progressive taxation in real estate dealings 
3. A heavy property tax for large-sized housing 
1986  2.12 policy  1. Exemption of housing sales tax for households 
2. Expansion of a nation-housing fund 
1988  8.10 policy 
1. Strengthening of tax exemption requisite 
2. Reorganization of housing sales tax 
3. Early execution of an integrated land tax system 
2.4 policy 
1. Extension of housing in the metropolitan area 
2. Establishment of a housing trading system 
3. Construction of five new towns  1989 
12.30 policy  1. Betterment recapture through land taxation 
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Appendix 2:  Important  Housing  Policies  and  their  Details  in  the 
1990s 
 
Year  The Principal Policies  Contents of Policy 
2.16 policy  1. Retroactivity of rent raised unfairly for 5 years 
4.13 policy 
1. Registration of housing trading 
2. Introduction of land trust 
3. Construction of multi-family housing   
4. Intensification of gift tax 
1990 
5.8 policy  1. Restraint of the acquisition of real estate by 
large companies 
9.19 policy  1. Imposing a fine for idle land 
2. Forced purchase of housing 
1995 
1.20 policy 
1. Construction of a national capital region   
2. Permission for land trading zone 
3. Taxation of land prices due to sharp rise 
1997  5.22 policy 
1. Deregulation of price ceiling 
2. Exemption of real estate sales tax 
3. Permission for re-sale of housing 
6.22 policy 
1. Lending partial payment for a house in 
installment sale 
2. Aid for redevelopment projects 
9.25 policy 
1. Aid for partial payments 
2. Liberalization of privately-built apartment 
housing 
12.12 policy 
1. Liberalization of privately-built apartment 
housing 
2. Reduction and exemption of real estate sales 
tax 
1998 
3.22 policy  1. Establishment of reconstruction funds 
5.31 policy  1. Lending partial payment 
2. Housing fund for small sized housing 
8.20 policy  1. The construction of 100,000 rental houses 
2. Upward funding limits for housing loans    1999 
10.7 policy 
1. Easing of a privately-managed subscription 
2. Establishing various branches which support 
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Appendix 3:  Important Housing Policies and their Details in 2000s 
 
Year  The Principal Policies  Contents of Policy 
2000  11.1 policy 
1. Construction of new cities 
2. Exemption of real estate sales tax in non-
metropolitan areas 
3. Reduction and exemption of housing bonds 
1.27 policy  1. Extension of businessman’s housing rental 
guarantee 
3.16 policy 
1. Supporting common people’s bank guarantee   
2. Supporting financing of businessman’s housing 
rental   
5.23 policy 
1. Discharge of new real estate sales tax 
2. Reduction and exemption of a registration tax 
of national housing 
5.26 policy  1. Extension of housing in multi-family land 
7.26 policy  1. Supply small-sized housing 
2001 
9.14 policy  1. Increase of 30,500 rental housing nationally 
2. Supply gratuitous land in the metropolitan area 
1.8 policy  1. Tax survey for speculators   
3.6 policy 
1. Restriction of resales in overheated investment 
zone 
2. Sales for the homeless masses   
5.20 policy 
1. Support of deposit money for leasing a house 
2. National construction of rental housing   
3. Increase in tenant guarantees 
8.9 policy 
1. Tighter rebuilding standards 
2. Investigation of the source of the money for 
reconstructions of apartments 
9.4 policy  1. Construction of new cities in the metropolitan 
area 
2002 
10.11 policy  1. Complaints about speculators   
2. Real estate sale taxation in speculations 
1.15 policy 
1. Appointment of new cities in the metropolitan 
area 
2. Construction of housing in the metropolitan 
area 
5.23 policy 
1. Resurrection of housing resales 
2. Construction of new towns in the metropolitan 
area 
5.28 policy  1. Construction of 500,000 rental housing 
nationally 
2003 
9.3 policy  1. Construction of 1,500,000 rental houses in 10 
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9.5 policy  1. Restriction of reconstruction shares 
2. Increase of small-sized reconstructions 
10.29 policy 
1. Double taxation of real estate sales tax 
2. The introduction of comprehensive real estate 
holding tax 
2004  2.2 policy  1. Promoting housing investment 
2. The creation of housing demands 
2.17 policy  1. Pressure for a feasibility study on 
reconstructions 
5.4 policy 
1. Taxation of real estate sales tax based on real 
prices 
2. Expansion of real estate tax 
3. Extension of reconstruction shares 
2005 
8.31 policy  1. Increase of housing supply 
2. Transparency of housing trading 




1. Construction of 1,640,000 housing units in the 
metropolitan area 
2. Increase in housing development in new towns 
1.11 policy 
1. Creation of a maximum sale price in 
speculative areas 
2. Restrictions on secured loans in speculations 
2007 
1.31 policy 
1. Expansion in supply for rental housing 
2. Increase in financing for common people 
3. Extension in lease market 
 